Search Results hz_party_site_uses_pkg




Overview

The APPS.HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES_PKG package is a foundational data-access (persistence) package within the Oracle E-Business Suite Trading Community Architecture (TCA). Its business function is to manage records in the HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES entity, which defines the specific "uses" or purposes associated with a party site. A party site represents a physical location belonging to a party (person or organization), and the site-use assignment determines the business contexts in which that location may be referenced — for example, as a billing address, a shipping address, a statement address, or a legal address.

In the ETRM 12.2.2 metadata, the object is classified as an API of type OTHER and is reported with a status of VALID under the APPS schema. It exposes the standard CRUD surface for the underlying table and is not itself a public, documented TCA business API in the sense of the higher-level HZ_PARTY_SITE_V2PUB package. Instead, it operates as the low-level implementation layer that other TCA packages and concurrent merge processes invoke to enforce the referential and logical integrity of party-site-use rows.

Key Procedures and Functions

The package exposes five documented procedures, covering the full row lifecycle of the HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES entity:

  • INSERT_ROW — Creates a new party-site-use record, establishing the association between a party site and a specific site-use type.
  • UPDATE_ROW — Modifies an existing party-site-use record, supporting changes to the use assignment or associated attributes.
  • LOCK_ROW — Acquires a row-level lock on the target party-site-use record, providing concurrency control before an update or delete is performed.
  • SELECT_ROW — Retrieves a single party-site-use record by its key, returning the column values into output parameters for the calling program.
  • DELETE_ROW — Removes a party-site-use record, ending the association between the party site and the use type.

The naming convention is consistent with the Oracle Forms-generated table-handler pattern, in which each procedure encapsulates a single DML operation against the base table and its translation table. Parameter lists are not enumerated here, as the ETRM metadata does not publish them; callers should obtain exact signatures from the package specification in the APPS schema.

Tables Accessed

Two base tables, referenced through APPS synonyms, are documented:

  • HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES — The primary table storing party-site-use assignments, including the party site reference, the site-use type, and status/effective-date information.
  • HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES_S — The corresponding translation table that holds language-specific or _TL-style records, ensuring descriptive fields are available across installed languages.
  • DUAL — The standard SYS-owned single-row utility table, used for expression evaluation and sequence or value retrieval within the package logic.

The package reads and writes these tables to persist party-site-use state while maintaining the linkage between the transactional table and its translations.

Usage Notes

This package is an internal TCA component. It is referenced by HZ_CUST_ACCOUNT_MERGE_V2PVT and HZ_PARTY_SITE_V2PUB, indicating that it is invoked during customer account merge processing and during party-site creation and maintenance flows driven by the public TCA APIs. Custom code should not normally call HZ_PARTY_SITE_USES_PKG directly; instead, developers should use the supported public APIs (HZ_PARTY_SITE_V2PUB and related packages) so that validation, Party Site Use Type lookups, and audit columns are applied consistently.

Direct invocation is generally limited to Oracle Forms-based maintenance screens, concurrent programs, and controlled extension code that requires row-level control. Callers must respect the dependency hierarchy: the package depends only on SYS.STANDARD, but changes to it can affect the two dependent packages listed in the ETRM record. Because the procedures are table-handler primitives without embedded business validation, any caller bypassing the public APIs assumes responsibility for entity integrity.